Established in 1867 as the General Lighthouse Authority for the island of Ireland, and operating under a constitution that dates to 1786, the Commissioners of Irish Lights’ mission was (and indeed remains) to ensure the safety at sea for all off the Irish coast. Working with lightkeepers, lightshipmen and its stores staff and steamers crews, Irish Lights maintain an extensive network of aids to navigation around the coastline. In 1919 that network was underpinned by 74 lighthouses and 11lightships, with the largest concentration along the south and west coasts. Mass travel was still by sea, transatlantic shipping was still in its hey day ,and the sea-lanes off the Irish coast were among the most significant in the world and of immense geopolitical importance.

That importance was highlighted during the First World War as lightkeepers and lightshipmen acted as a quasi-coast watching service, reporting on the war at sea as observed from their stations. Events in Ireland after the war’s end, however, soon forced them to keep an eye both on land and sea. Even before the end of the war in Europe the Commander in Chief of the British Forces in Ireland, Sir Bryan Mahon, had written to the Commissioners of Irish Lights. Mindful of ongoing tensions in the wake of the Easter Rising of 1916, Mahon was concerned about the security of Irish Lights’ stocks of explosives and the possibility that they could be ‘stolen by ill-disposed persons’. A review of the situation revealed that Irish Lights held almost 300,000 cotton- and gun-powder charges in its various stores, along with c. 300,000 detonators. Much of this stock was located at isolated lighthouses and fog signal stations around the coast and, as Irish Lights informed Mahon, couldn’t be considered safe from a determined raiders. Though the posting of military sentries at particularly vulnerable stations was suggested, the proposal was allowed to lapse and the issue lay dormant for the next eighteen months.

Irish Lights held such a substantial quantity of explosives for very good reason. Fog signals - typically attached to lighthouses and lightships - were a vital element in the coastal navigation service. While advances in technology had seen the introduction of more modern equipment, at least 15 of Irish Lights’ signals were still explosive in nature, requiring charges, tonite and detonators. Following the outbreak of the War of Independence in 1919, this proved to be precisely the kind of equipment that would attract the Irish Republican Army’s attention.

Between May 1919 and November 1921, IRA units carried out twenty-four raids on twelve separate lighthouses and fog signal stations. They were concentrated for the most part on remote stations along the south and west coasts (see map), and yielded thousands of explosive charges and detonators. Stations such as Hook Head, Mizen Head and Mine Head were raided several times. Each raid was reported to Irish Lights’ headquarters; these accounts offer a new perspective on IRA operations during the War of Independence, as well as their impact both on Ireland’s lighthouse service and those who maintained that service.

Just a single raid had been reported by the end of1919, when Mine Head was visited by twelve masked men who made off with some old rifles and bayonets. The keeper was allowed to continue operating the lighthouse throughout, which was a notable feature of all but one subsequent raid. The only exception occurred at Fanad Head on 4 September 1920, when the station was raided at 1am by four members of the IRA’s 1st Northern Division. The Principal Keeper, Leonard Stocker, was ordered to extinguish the light for an hour while the unit attacked the nearby Coastguard station. Stocker reported that he was kept covered throughout by a revolver ‘in such a position that it would be madness to try and keep the light lighting’. Failure to keep the light on at all times was perhaps the greatest dereliction of duty possible for a lightkeeper, and it’s a measure of the wartime conditions then prevailing that he escaped even the slightest censure from Irish Lights’ board.

Stocker’s account illustrates the dilemma that often faced lightkeepers - resist the raiders in order to protect what was an essential and potentially life-saving maritime service, or submit and hope that the station and keepers would be allowed to continue their work. The raid also provides a vivid example of a distinction that seems to have been drawn between Irish Lights and the Coastguard service. Coastguard stations were frequently located beside or very close to lighthouses and the service was regarded as an extension of the British security forces in Ireland. While lightkeepers worked closely with the Coastguard, there is no report of violence towards any lightkeeper, or destruction of Irish Lights’ property. Lightkeepers were certainly threatened, and incidental damage done to lighthouses in the course of raids, but these were minor incidents when compared to the treatment of Coastguard stations, which were frequently attacked and burned down during the war. The Fanad Head raid occurred at the height of the war. Prior to the summer of 1920, with just one raid between January 1919 and May 1920, it appeared that Irish Lights might emerge relatively unscathed. Nonetheless, a review of its explosive stores by the Royal Irish Constabulary in February 1920 illustrated the potential bounty for ‘ill-disposed persons’: more than 21 tonnes of explosive charges remained in lighthouse magazines and stores. A suggestion from the Chief Secretary’s Office that the stocks of explosives at vulnerable stations be reduced to the bare minimum was rejected: Having regard to the remote situation of these stations and the extreme difficulty of access in almost every instance, it is absolutely necessary to keep a large stock of explosives on hand, as not only would the expense and inconvenience involved in forwarding small quantities be prohibitive … [it] would involve grave risk of failure of fog signals through lack of material in the event of any sudden and prolonged period of fog. On 27 April Irish Lights’ Secretary, Hubert Cook ,informed the Chief Secretary that, as they were unable to protect their stores, Irish Lights ‘must accordingly leave the safeguarding of these explosives in the hands of His Majesty’s Government’. The RIC had also highlighted a number of stations that it considered particularly vulnerable to raids, including Mizen Head, Kinsale and Loop Head. It deemed others as unlikely targets, especially island stations (known as rock stations) such as Fastnet and Eagle Island. Such optimism would prove misplaced. Just three weeks after Cook’s warning, the IRA began a sustained campaign of raids on lighthouses and fog signal stations.
‍

Notice to Mariners No. 9, 21 Aug.1920, warning that the fog signal at Mizen Head would shortly be discontinued(Commissioners of Irish Lights Archive, WR/2/12)

Lightkeepers had no training in how to deal with armed raiders. As formal communications from employee to employer, their reports to Irish Lights headquarters tend to be quite reserved. But they do occasionally give some insight into lightkeepers’ interactions with the raiders and the regular, if often implicit, threat of violence. Mine Head, site of the first lighthouse raid in May 1919, was subjected to four further raids in September 1920 and May, June and July 1921. On at least two of these occasions the raiders explicitly warned the lightkeepers not to inform either the police or the military. On 23 May 1921 George James, Principal Lightkeeper at the station, reported that he had obeyed these instructions:

‍I most respectfully beg to state the reason I did not inform the police was viz. those raiders when taking the bicycle threatened that if I gave information to the police or military I would be looked upon as an informer and treated accordingly. As there was no protection in this locality and owing to the above mentioned threats, my life and those dependent on me would have been in danger had I communicated with the police on the matter.

‍The steady escalation of IRA raids from May 1920 saw Irish Lights increase the frequency of its appeals for assistance and protection from the military. British forces were, however, stretched too thinly to provide adequate protection. Capt. William Henry Davis, Inspector and Marine Superintendent for Irish Lights, repeatedly met with senior Dublin Castle officials during the summer of 1920 seeking advice; the best offered was a repeat of the earlier suggestion to reduce the reserves of explosives at certain stations to just 24 hours. An alternative system was implemented, however, whereby the majority of Irish Lights’ explosives were stored in military garrisons and distributed as needed - similar to a just-in-time supply chain, and one that left the stations at near constant risk of running out of explosives.

It was also a system vulnerable to exploitation in areas where the IRA could rely on good local intelligence. At 6pm on 29 July 1920, Mizen Head Fog Signal Station received a large delivery of charges and detonators from the military. Just over twenty-four hours later, in the early morning of 31 July, the 3rd Cork Brigade raided the lighthouse. In a short account sent to Irish Lights HQ, lightkeeper Frederick Duffy reported that the raiders left with 11 cases of charges and 2,000 detonators, and that the key to the lighthouse magazine was demanded ‘in the name of the Irish Republic’. The Assistant Keeper then on duty, James O’Connor, ‘had no other course open to him only to comply’.

An account from the raiders’ perspective, by Maurice Donegan of Bandon, neatly illustrates the value of these explosives to the IRA’s operations:

In West Cork we were very short of explosives except for black powder which is really a localised explosive, so we determined to raid the lighthouse at Mizen Head where a considerable quantity of guncotton and tonite was kept, made up in small cylinders for use as fog signals and flares. To get to the Mizen we had to pass close to Brow Head just to the South and where there was a military post connected up with the lighthouse by telephone … There were about twelve of us and we got to our objective without alarming the military, held up the three lighthouse keepers and dismantled the ‘phone. It was the severest physical test I was ever put to, carrying a hundredweight box of guncotton or tonite up a steep ascent of about one hundred steps to the top of the hill overlooking the lighthouse … We got all the stuff away in a lorry we had brought for the purpose and eventually stowed away safely in a prepared dump. We disposed of the cylinders in which the guncotton and tonite were packed and the explosives themselves were those used in all the mines subsequently prepared for our war against the British in West Cork.

‍The Mizen Head Raid was a turning point. Storing the explosives under military guard with regular deliveries to lighthouses was not working. Throughout the summer of 1920 Irish Lights head office received a number of urgent telegrams from Mizen Head and other fog signal stations, reporting dwindling stocks of explosives and requesting immediate resupply. Moreover, without an actual military guard at each lighthouse there was no guarantee that even the reduced stock on site wouldn’t be stolen.‍

Irish Lights took the dramatic step of publishing open letters in the national press, highlighting the dangers to shipping if fog signals were not operational and appealing for the raids to stop. Their appeals went unheeded. With fog signalling now unreliable, the British government advised the Cunard and White Star shipping lines to drop the ‘Eastern Call’ at Queenstown/Cobh from their transatlantic passenger services.

On 11 August 1920, Irish Lights wrote to the Admiralty and to the Under Secretary, informing them of its decision to close Mizen Head and all other mainland fog signal stations once they had exhausted their current supply of explosives:

‍In view of possible marine disaster and loss of life consequent upon such action, the Commissioners feel that the closing down of these stations should be avoided if by any means possible, and have directed me again to urge upon you the extreme gravity of the situation. They feel, however, that, in the absence of adequate protection, they have no alternative, as to replenish the stock under existing conditions would, in their opinion, be criminal folly.

’With neither the government nor the military prepared or indeed able to provide further protection, fog signalling at Hook Head, the Old Head of Kinsale, Loop Head, Poer Head and Roches Point stations was discontinued.

There had been an assumption that the more remote island stations would be safe from the IRA, yet perhaps the most spectacular raid was a daring midnight operation on Fastnet Lighthouse on 20 June 1921. A thrilling description, from the perspective of one of the raiders, is found in the Bureau of Military History Witness Statement of Sean O’Driscoll. It provides a fascinating counterpoint to the report of one the lightkeepers on duty at the time, John Crowley :

‍On the morning of the 20th at 1am Fastnet was raided by armed men who ordered me to put up my hands while in bed and then ordered us to get up and dress. Some of the raiders rushed up to the services room and smashed [the]transmitting key of wireless instrument … I was then ordered to keep watch on the light while the other keepers were ordered to lead the way to magazine. I asked the leader to leave me a supply, at the same time telling him of the danger we were in of running short. He said he would leave me 24 hours supply and to communicate with my authorities and inform them of the raid.

The operation demonstrated that even Fastnet, perhaps the most isolated and difficult to access lighthouse in the service, could be raided. It was, however, more easily secured than most. The simple act of locking the tower door from the inside turned the lighthouse into an impregnable fortress. Crucially this ensured that the fog signal - which Irish Lights considered necessary to maintain at all costs - could continue to operate.

By the end of 1920, raids on lighthouses were no longer yielding explosives, with telescopes, signalling lamps and rockets, bicycles, and electrical cable more typical of the material stolen. Though relatively minor equipment, the loss of telescopes and signalling apparatus seriously diminished the ability of lightkeepers to carry out their duties. Irish Lights once more published letters in the press appealing for a cessation:

Owing to the recrudescence of raids upon lighthouses and the removal of stores, etc., the Commissioners of Irish Lights have found it necessary to renew their warning to mariners that fog signals on the Irish coast are not to be relied on under existing conditions … It is felt that, if the raiders understood their action imperils the lives of all seamen and passengers approaching the dangers guarded by the lights and fog signals and may have a serious effect on the commerce of this country, and if they realised the loss inflicted on the lightkeepers at rock stations, by being deprived of their means of communicating with the shore, they would desist from their attacks, which do not in any way affect the Government … the Government is not, in fact, one penny the worse for the loss of the stores, etc., taken by the raiders.

‍Despite the lack of explosives available, the number of raids in 1921 increased to fourteen, with one occurring after the truce between the IRA and British forces began on 11 July 1921.
The dangers of the lack of fog signalling were apparent from the stranding of the SS Elsie Annie off Hook Head at 4.45pm on 22 September 1921, which the captain blamed on the density of fog then lying and the lack of signalling. Hopes that the Anglo-Irish Treaty might bring about a return to normality were dashed in early 1922, and lighthouses were subjected to more than twenty raids during the Civil War. It was not until the end of June 1924 that all fog signal stations were restored to operational status.
‍
‍Timeline of Raids on Lighthouses during the War of Independence
1919
Mine Head Lighthouse (14 May 1919)
‍1920
Mizen Head Fog Signal Station (16 May 1920)
Hook Head Lighthouse (31 May 1920)
Roancarrig Lighthouse (23 July 1920)
Mizen Head Fog Signal Station (31 July 1920)
Fanad Head Lighthouse (4 September 1920)
Mine Head Lighthouse (22 September 1920)
Hook Head Lighthouse (24 September 1920)
Roancarrig Lighthouse (8 October 1920)
Roches Point Lighthouse (28 November 1920)
‍1921
Fanad Head Lighthouse (3 January 1921)
Hook Head Lighthouse (11 January 1921)
Rotten Island Lighthouse (13 February 1921)
Arranmore Lighthouse (25 March 1921)
Bull Rock Lighthouse (22 April 1921)
Mine Head Lighthouse (16 May 1921)
Duncannon North Lighthouse (21 May 1921)
Fastnet Lighthouse (20 June 1921)
Galley Head Lighthouse (21 June 1921)
Bull Rock Lighthouse (22 June 1921)
Mine Head Lighthouse (28 June 1921)
Mizen Head Fog Signal Station (1 July 1921)
Mine Head Lighthouse (9 July 1921)
Haulbowline Lighthouse (12 November 1921) 
‍Dr Eoin Kinsella is a consultant historian and author of the forthcoming The Irish Defence Forces, 1922–2022: Servant of the Nation (Four Courts Press, 2022) Note on Sources
Accounts of raids on lighthouses between 1919 and 1923, from the perspective of the raiders, can occasionally be found in the records of the Bureau of Military History and Military Service Pensions Collection. Each raid was also carefully recorded by the lightkeepers present at each station and reported to the Commissioners of Irish Lights - these reports can be found in the War and Raid Files Collection, housed in Irish Lights’ archive. This article draws upon that collection, which will be available to view online via UCD Digital Library in early 2022.